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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the role of financial structure on the volatility of real effective exchange rates 
in Korea.  (1). Historical developments of size, activity and efficiency of financial structure, 
including banking and nonblank financial institutions, are investigated for the last three decades in 
Korea.  (2). Using the concept of bank-based and market-based financial structure, it is shown that 
there exists a stable long-run relationships between the financial structure of an economy and the 
volatility of real effective exchange rates.   (3). Development of market-based system can 
successfully isolate foreign shocks and reduce the volatility of the real effective exchange rates while 
increased bank-based system destabilize the volatility of the real exchange.  This can be explained 
by the strong requirement of information disclosure in the stock market induce risk-sharing activities 
of investors. (4). Policy implication is that transfer of risk from banking sector to stock market or 
non-bank financial institutions could stabilize the volatility of asset prices. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
he literature on currency crises has provided a number of suggestions about the possible influence of 
financial structure on the volatility of asset prices and capital flows. There is by now a documented 
empirical evidence of the relationship between the financial structure and financial crisis.  While this 
may provide some indirect insight about the relationship between asset volatility – interpreted as extreme variations of 
prices – and financial structure, a more direct analysis seems to be missing.  Although finance theory tells us that the 
linkage between the financial structure of the economy and the likelihood of financial crises is provided by the 
volatility of financial and nonfinancial assets this intermediate link is still somewhat unexplored.  Real exchange rates 
often show disrupt corrections in a space of a few quarters, when there seems to be no concrete reason why exchange 
rates should have changed at all.  Sometimes speculative asset price changes dramatically in a matter of days or even 
hours.  On 11 December 1997, the day of the worst crash in Korean foreign exchange market history, the Korean won-
U.S. dollar exchange rate almost doubled. Analyses of news service records show that during that interval of time 
there was virtually no economic news except for the news of the exchange rate drop itself.  Such evidence would seem 
to suggest that the source of market volatility is something loosely called "market psychology," the changing public 
expectations, attitudes, and theories about the market (Shiller, 1992). 
 
In this paper, we examine how the financial structure of an economy, Korea, affects the volatility of real 
Korean won-U.S. dollar exchange rates using time-series data.  To measure empirically the financial structure of a 
country we employ the recently developed concept of bank-based versus market-based financial structure (Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine, 1999).  In section II, we describe the development of Korea's financial structure.  In section III, we 
investigate the statistical properties of each time series used in this study and test for a stable long-run relationship 
among financial structure and volatility of the real exchange rate in Korea using Johansen’s conintegration technique.  
In section IV, we investigate the dynamic impact of financial structure on the volatility of real exchange rate using the 
vector-autoregression model.  Conclusions are presented in section V. 
 
 
 
T 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – January 2007                                      Volume 6, Number 1 
 30 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF KOREA'S FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 
 
This section will investigate the changes in financial structure and the underlying regulation, tax, and legal 
changes that caused them. The most important policy measure of government-led economic development in Korea 
was financial policy (e.g., interest rate regulation and policy loans). The heavy intervention of the Korean government 
in the financial system during the 1960s and 1970s is revealed by its discretionary allocation of funds to target 
industries through policy loans (credit rationing). This caused misallocation (overinvestment) of financial resources 
into the heavy manufacturing and chemical industries, which led to creditor bankers' losses.  The banking sector 
suffered from a lack of competitiveness, an accumulation of non-performing assets, and delays in liberalization.  
Policy loans at preferential interest rates accounted for half of the total credit offered by domestic financial institutions 
in 1970s and about 30 percent in the 1980s with the expansion of non-bank financial Institutions (NBFIs, hereafter; 
Bank of Korea, 1995). 
 
In the fifth economic development plan (‘82-’86), the Korean government put more emphasis on the stability, 
efficiency, and social equity within the economy, believing that a massive misallocation of resources in the heavy 
manufacturing and chemical industries could have been avoided if the functioning of the financial system had been 
left in the hands of the private sector.  The government tried to improve efficiency through the promotion of 
competition and private initiative. The goals of financial reform were reducing inefficiency and preventing private 
rent-seeking and foreign control of the financial market (Amsden and Euh, 1993). 
 
Changes In Financial Structure, Size, Activity, And Efficiency In Korea 
 
Among financial institutions, banks provide funds mostly through loans and they dominated in financial 
institution borrowings until the 1970s.  
 
Table 1: Financial Market Composition Of Korea* 
 
 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 
Financial Institutions 38.0 40.7 45.6 48.7 52.5 
         Banks 29.2 26.2 23.2 20.3 19.2 
         Non-Banks 8.8 14.5 22.4 28.4 33.2 
Security Market 11.1 15.6 20.0 27.1 27.0 
         Stocks 9.7 11.1 11.9 16.4 11.4 
         Bonds 1.3 4.5 8.1 10.7 15.6 
CP Market 0.5 1.4 3.2 4.7 4.0 
Foreign Market 13.6 13.3 6.0 0.2 2.2 
Other Finance 36.9 29.0 25.2 19.3 14.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes: * denotes the non-financial sector’s fund raising, CP denotes commercial paper, Source:  The Financial System in Korea 
(1995), Bank of Korea. 
 
 
Their relative importance has gradually declined, slipping from 29.2 percent of the market in the first half of 
the 1970s to 19.2 percent in the first half of the 1990s.  Whereas Table 1 shows that the market shares of non-banks 
and securities market increased over the period 1970-74 to 1990-94 from 8.8 percent to 33.2 percent and from 11.1 
percent to 27.0 percent respectively.  The share of deposits held by non-banks increased from 31.6 percent in 1980 to 
67.6 percent in 1995  
 
Despite the slow pace of reform, Korea's financial market experienced growth in  overall size and activity.  
Korean financial depth increased from 49.4 percent in 1981 to 103.2 percent in 1989 and to 150.0 percent in 1995, 
mostly due to the growth in the non-banking sector.  However, stock market capitalization to GDP grew even more 
over this period, from 6 percent to 63.4 percent.  This explains the growth in the stock market's relative size, which 
started out at 20 percent in early 1980s, but ended the decade at 90 percent.  During the same period, stock market 
liquidity and bank credit to the private sector also increased, leading to an increase in overall activity from 44 percent 
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to 82 percent of GDP.  However, the growth in stock market liquidity far outweighed that in bank credit as can be 
seen from relative activity figures.  Looking at efficiency indicators, relative efficiency increased whereas overall 
efficiency fell during the period.  This is because although stock market turnover increased with liberalization, 
banking spreads increased even more. 
 
Table 2: Market Share of Financial Institutions in Korea 
 
 Loans (in percent) Deposits (in percent) 
 1980 1985 1990 1995* 1980 1985 1990 1995* 
Deposit Money Bank** 63.3 58.4 48.3 42.9 68.4 53.5 41.0 32.4 
 -32.2% -52.6% 
NBFI’s *** 36.7 41.6 51.7 57.1 31.6 46.5 59.0 67.6 
 55.6% 113.9% 
A.Development Bank 14.8 10.8 8.3 8.0 3.8 4.1 3.1 4.2 
 -45.9% 10.5% 
B.Savings Institutions 13.0 16.3 25.3 33.3 13.5 15.5 27.1 36.5 
 152.6% 170% 
C.Investment Institute 5.8 7.6 8.1 6.8 9.5 15.8 16.2 15.5 
 17.2% 63% 
D.LifeInsurance Co. 3.1 6.9 10.0 9.0 4.8 11.1 12.6 11.4 
 190.3% 137.5% 
Notes: * denotes the amount by the end of June, 1995.  ** denotes money deposits at banks.  *** denotes Non-banking Financial 
Institutions.  % denotes the total growth rate between June 1980 and June 1995.  Source:  The Financial System in Korea (1995), 
Bank of Korea. 
 
 
Development Of Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
 
In this section, we analyze the development of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), their special 
treatment by law and regulation, their structure and business activities, their role in stimulating and mobilizing savings, 
and their contribution to Korea's economic development Many NBFIs were introduced in 1972 in response to the 
Presidential Emergency Decree for Economic Stabilization and Growth.  Their numbers and volume of funds grew 
significantly during the rapid economic growth of the 1970s and 1980s.  A further contribution to their rapid growth 
came from the relatively higher interest rates permitted to them and the greater degree of autonomy in management 
they were allowed compared to traditional banks. In 1982, requirements for establishing NBFIs were reduced and 
consequently twelve short-term finance companies and 57 mutual savings and finance companies began operations. 
During the period 1987 to 1990, five securities trust companies and eighteen life insurance companies were in 
operation (Bank of Korea,1995). 
 
NBFIs can be classified into four categories according to their business activities: i) development institutions, 
which consist of the Korea Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of Korea, and the Korea Long Term Credit 
Bank; ii) investment institutions, which consist of investment and finance companies, merchant banking corporations, 
and securities investment trust companies; iii) savings institutions including trust accounts of banks, mutual savings 
and finance companies, credit unions, mutual credit facilities, community credit cooperatives, and postal savings; and 
iv) life insurance institutions. 
 
Out of these four categories of NBFIs, investment, and life insurance institutions grew most rapidly during 
the period 1980-1995.  These NBFIs have contributed significantly to the stimulation and mobilization of savings 
since they were able to circumvent the interest-rate ceilings on both the sources and uses of funds (Koo, 1993).  Table 
2 shows that over the period 1980-1995, the share of loans made by NBFIs increased from 36.7 percent to 57.1 
percent.  On the demand side, high real interest rates (due to slowing price increases in the early 1980s) jeopardized 
the viability of firms with high financial leverage.  Because of the repressed commercial bank interest rates, 
corporations not supported by the government were forced to borrow from NBFIs.  NBFIs evaded the low interest-rate 
policy of MOF by requiring compensating balances that borrowers had to redeposit in the same financial institution, 
thereby raising the effective interest rates on the original loans (Bank of Korea, 1995). 
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A Measure Of Financial Structure 
 
The measurement of financial structure in this study draws heavily on the recent work by Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine (1999) that derived several findings on the relationship between financial structure and per capita income 
level.  According to their study, in higher income countries, banks and other financial intermediaries as well as stock 
markets and the overall financial system tend to be larger, more active, and more efficient.  In higher income countries 
insurance companies, pension funds, and other nonblank financial intermediaries are larger as a share of GDP.   
 
For practical purposes, we used three variables as indicators of Korea's financial structure: bank assets to 
GDP (claims on the private sector by commercial banks to GDP, BANK); non-banking financial institution’s assets to 
GDP as a measurement of other financial institution’s size (NBFI); and stock-market capitalization to GDP as a 
measure of stock market development (MK). Variable definitions are given in the Appendix.  Figure 1 shows the 
changing pattern of the financial structure in Korea and Table 2 shows the volatility of four financial variables. 
 
THE DATA AND THEIR STATISTICAL PROPERTIES 
 
In this section we define the variables used in this study and test the stationarity of those variables using two 
different unit root test procedures. 
 
The Data And Their Statistical Properties 
 
All quarterly data are from the March 1999 issue of the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, CD-Rom 
version, and are seasonally adjusted using exponential smoothing.  Data definitions are found in the Appendix.  A 
control variable is used to isolate the effects of structural variables (that are expected to maintain their impact over the 
long run) from the short-run effects of policy -- monetary or fiscal -- on the volatility of the real exchange rates a la 
Krumm (1993). Volatility responds to both real and monetary variables.  Monetary and fiscal variables are combined 
into one macroeconomic control variable, VV, which is defined as the percentage change in domestic credit over and 
above the percentage change in GDP, foreign prices, and the nominal exchange rate. 
 
VV = DC* - Y* - Pf* - NE*  (1) 
 
where DC is domestic credit, Y is GDP, Pf is U.S. WPI, NE is the nominal exchange rate to the U.S. dollar, and * 
indicates percentage change.  In order to examine the stationarity of each time series, we conducted unit root tests.  
Table 3 reports the results from the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Paco Goerlich Tests, which reveal that all series 
have unit roots. 
 
Table 3:  Tests Of Unit Roots 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Variable Lags ADF  ADF  
Joint Test Of Unit 
Root And No 
Constant VRX 2 (1) -2.29 -10.7 4.0 
NBVB 0 (0) 1.15 0.82 3.27 
BANK 14 (1) -0.63 -0.87 2.29 
MK 8 (8) -1.25 -3.07 1.23 
Note: ** denotes that the estimate is significant at 5 percent critical level. 
 
Paco Goerlich Test 
Variable 
AR 
Corrections 
Constant, Trend Constant 
No constant, 
No Trend 
Conclusion 
VRX 4 -1.29 -1.07 -1.12 Unit root, no drift 
NBVB 4 -2.66 -0.12 N.A. Unit root, drift 
BANK 4 -1.79 -1.03 1.61 Unit root, no drift 
MK 4 -1.98 2.19 1.29 Unit root no drift 
Note: ** denotes that the estimate is significant at 5 percent critical level. 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Impulse Response Functions Of REER Volatility 
 
Shocks To Bank Financial Institutions' Assets 
 
Shocks To Stock Market Capitalizations 
 
Shocks To Non-bank Financial Institutions 
 
 
 
Johansen’s Cointegration Test 
 
Since all variables are non-stationary, we use Johansen's co-integration analysis to test whether those 
variables have co-integrating vectors.  Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) developed a cointegration 
test methodology that overcome most of the problems of the previous two-step approach. 
 
Johansen and Juselius (1990) considered the following general model: 
 
1 1 ..... , 1,.... (2)t t t k t k tX X X v t T         
 
where tX  is a vector of variables ; 1,....., t   are independent and normal errors with zero mean and covariance 
matrix   X t-k, X 0 are fixed; and v is an intercept vector.  Economic time series are often non-stationary and 
systems such as the above vector-autoregressive representation (VAR) can be written in the conventional first-
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difference form: 
 
1 1 ..... , 1,.... (3)t t t k t k tX X X v t T         
 
where 1 2(1 ........... ), 1,2,..., 1i k i k         and 1 2(1 ........... )k       . 
 
The only level term in equation (3) is t kX  .  Thus, only the  matrix contains information about the 
long-run relationship between the variables in the data vector.  There are three possible cases: 
 
 If the   matrix has rank zero then all variables in X are integrated of order one or higher and the VAR has 
no long-run properties; 
 If the  matrix has rank p (i.e., it is of full rank ), the variables in X are stationary; and 
 If  matrix has rank r ( 0 < r < p),  can be decomposed into two distinct (p*r) matrices  and 
 such that '  . 
 
The third case implies that there are r cointegrating vectors.  The parameters of the cointegrating vectors are 
contained in the  matrix. Therefore  ’X is stationary even though Xt  itself is nonstationary.  The matrix 
gives weights with which the cointegrating vectors enter each equation of the system. To determine the number of 
cointegrating vectors, r, Johansen and Juselius (1990) used two likelihood-ratio tests.  The first test is based on the 
maximal eigenvalue (   MAX) -- the null hypothesis is that there are at most r cointegrating vectors against the 
alternative r+1 cointegrating vectors.  The second test is based on the trace of the stochastic matrix (TRACE) -- the 
null hypothesis is that there are at most r cointegrating vectors against the alternative hypothesis that there are r or 
more cointegrating vectors.  Two likelihood-ratio tests for the existence and cointegrating vectors are reported in 
Table 4.  Johansen’s cointegration tests are implemented using four lags and for four sets of five variables which 
include the volatility, financial structure, and control variables. 
 
Table 4 shows that the volatility of the real effective exchange rate has three cointegrating vectors with the 
financial structure variables at the 10 percent critical level based on both  max and Trace statistics.  One of the 
cointegrating vectors can be written as follows: 
 
.024 VREX + 2.052 NBFI - 13.05 BANK -.723 MK + 0.151 VV = 0  (7). 
 
This cointegrating vector is consistent with the impulse response analysis of the vectorautoregression model presented 
in Figures 4-A and 4-B. 
 
 
Table 4: Johansen’s Cointegration Test (Endogenous Series: VREX, NBFI, BANK, MK, VV) 
 
Lags In The Model: 4, No. Of Observations=65, No. Of Observations - No. Of Variables=45 
Eigen-Value L-max Trace H0: r p-r L-max90 Trace90 
0.8804 138.03** 212.02** 0 5 18.96 55.54 
0.4726 41.59** 73.99** 1 4 15.00 36.58 
0.3126 24.37** 32.40** 2 3 11.23 21.58 
0.1049 7.20 8.03 3 2 7.37 10.35 
0.0127 0.83 0.83 4 1 2.98 2.98 
Notes:  ** denotes significant at 10 percent. 
 
Cointegrating Vector 
VREX NBFI BANK MK VV 
0.024 2.052 -13.05 -0.723 0.151 
0.496 5.429 -27.166 -1.250 -0.594 
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DYNAMIC ANALYSIS USING A VECTOR-AUTOREGRESSION MODEL 
 
In this section we use the vector-autoregression model to examine the dynamic impact of financial structure 
on the volatility of the financial variables. 
 
A Vector-Autoregression Model 
 
We will test the dynamic impact of changing financial structure on the volatility of 솓 real exchange rates 
using the vector-autoregressive model presented in equations (5).  
 
1
( ) , ( )
L
t t s t t t
s
X L X E  

                    (5) 
 
Let the vector of stationary variables be X={ vrx ,smk, bank,  nbfi, ps}, the vector of shocks be 
{ , , , , }vrx smk bank nbfi pst      , and and   are vectors of coefficients for the vector-autoregressive model 
and L is the lag operator.  Where vrx is the volatility of the real effective exchange rate, smk is the amount of stock 
market capitalization divided by GDP, bank is claims on the private sector by commercial banks, nbfi is the ratio of 
bank to non-bank financial institutions' assets, and ps is the macroeconomic policy stance variable to control for the 
impact of macroeconomic policies. 
 
Impulse Response Function Analysis 
 
The goal of this section is to investigate the dynamic impact of financial structural variables on the volatility 
of the real exchange rates.  Granger-causality amongst these variables is examined and the results are reported in 
Table 5.   
 
Table 5: Granger-Causality Test Volatility Of Real Effective Exchange Rate 
 
 VREX NBFI BANK MK VV 
VREX .000** .14 .29 .25 .90 
NBFI .65 .000** .001** .006** .035** 
BANK .018** .000** .000** .000** .014** 
MK .23 .000** .75 .000** .35 
VV .69 .23 .019** .63 .023** 
Notes: Figures are significance probabilities.  ** denotes significant at 5 percent. 
 
 
Based on these causality tests and economic theory, the ordering of the variables in the vector-autoregression 
is determined. Various different orderings are tried to see the robustness of the test result.  The dynamic impact of 
financial structure and macroeconomic policy stance variables are analyzed through the computation of variance 
decompositions (VDCs) and impulse response functions (IRFs) which, in turn, are based on the moving-average 
representation of the VAR model and reflect both direct and indirect effects. In particular, the VDCs for vrex indicate 
the percentage of the forecast-error variance in the vrex accounted by the financial structure and VV. 
 
Dynamic Impact Of Financial Structure On The Real Exchange Rates 
 
An optimal lag of four is chosen based on the likelihood-ratio test and the model is then estimated.  Since 
different orderings of the variables in the VAR estimation yield different results, various orderings based on the 
Granger-causality tests reported in Table 4 were tried.  However, different orderings did not bring about significant 
differences.  From the impulse response function and variance decomposition of forecast-error variances, we find the 
following: 
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Volatility Of Real Effective Exchange Rate 
 
 SMK - The impulse response functions are shown in Table 1. Panel A in Table 1 shows that stock market 
capitalization (smk) decreases the volatility of the real effective exchange rate.  Increased stock market 
capitalization leads to the increased information dissemination in the market and increased information in the 
market, in turn,  provides investors incentives of risk sharing (Lakonishok et al, 2002; Albuquerque, 2003).  
This risk sharing behavior of investors decrease the volatility of the real exchange rates.  Patten (2000) 
reports evidence that increased information disclosure in the stock market decreases volatility of trading 
volume while Gintschel and Markov (2004) reports that regulation fair dsclosure stabilized stock prices. 
 BANK - The increased private claims of commercial banks to GDP (BANK) increase the volatility of the 
real exchange rates in Korea.  Poorer information generation of increased banking activities could lead to the 
herding of investors in the foreign exchange market (Welch, 2000: Dahlquist et al, 2004).  
 NBFI - Increased activities of non-bank financial institutions reduce the volatility of the real exchange rates.  
This effect can be explained by the transfer of risk from banking sector to other financial institutions.   
 
Variance Decomposition 
 
Variance decomposition of the VAR model is reported in Table 6.  
 
 
Table 6: Variance Decomposition Of The VAR Model Decomposition Of Volatility Of Real Effective Exchange Rate 
 
 Percentage of the forecast-error variance of VREX explained by: 
Quarters VREX NBFI BANK MK VV 
4 90.05 0.08 2.73 6.21 0.92 
8 80.23 0.29 6.80 11.57 1.08 
12 79.81 0.30 6.56 11.91 1.40 
16 79.61 0.32 6.60 11.98 1.48 
20 79.24 0.35 6.72 12.19 1.48 
24 79.16 0.36 6.71 12.27 1.48 
 
 
With the exception of the real effective exchange rate itself, stock market capitalization to GDP plays the 
most important role in explaining the forecast error variance of the volatility of the real effective exchange rate, 
explaining about 12 percent of the forecast error variance by 8 quarters.  The next most important explanatory variable 
is private claims of the banking sector (BANK), explaining about 7 percent by 8 quarters.  However, the policy stance 
and non-bank financial institutions (NBFI) variables explain very little of the forecast-error variance of the volatility 
of the real effective exchange rate. Table 6 shows the variance decomposition of the volatility of the real effective 
exchange rate in Korea. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study identifies the role of financial structure on the volatility of the real effective exchange rates.  We 
used the concept of market-based and bank-based financial structure developed by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) 
to investigate the changing role of financial structure on the volatility of the real exchange rates.  From this case study 
of Korea, we have two unique findings.   First, it is shown that there exists a long-run stable relationship between 
financial structure of an economy and the volatility of real effective exchange rates.  Second, we find that the dynamic 
impact of financial structure on the volatility of the real effective exchange rates is asymmetric, i.e., increased stock 
market capitalization decrease the volatility of the real effective exchange rates whereas increased private claims of 
commercial banks to GDP increase the volatility of the real effective exchange rates.  This implies that as Korea’s 
financial structure moves from a bank-based to a market-based system, the volatility of the real effective exchange 
rate decrease and this is true even in the mid-1980s with a more flexible exchange rate.    In other words, development 
of market-based system can successfully isolate foreign shocks and reduce the volatility of the real effective exchange 
rates while development of bank-based system increases the volatility of the real exchange.  This can be explained by 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – January 2007                                      Volume 6, Number 1 
 37 
the strong requirement of information disclosure in the stock market induce risk-sharing activities of investors and 
stabilize the asset price.  Policy implication is that transfer of risk from banking sector to stock market or non-bank 
financial institutions could stabilize the volatility of asset prices.  Future study will investigate whether the findings of 
this study are robust with respect to the cross-country data. 
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DATA APPENDIX: SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS 
 
1.  RX: real effective exchange rate defined as a six-month window standard deviation for each quarter; data are 
from JP Morgan. 
2.  BOND: government bond yield on housing  (IFS line 61). 
3.  STK: stock price index (IFS line 62). 
4. MMR: money-market rate (IFS line 60b). 
5.  VRX: volatility of real effective exchange rate defined as a six-month window standard deviation for each 
quarter; data are from JP Morgan. 
6.  VBOND: volatility of the government bond yield on housing defined as a six-month window standard 
deviation for each quarter (IFS line 61). 
7.  VSTK: volatility of the stock price defined as a six-month window standard deviation for each quarter (IFS 
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line 62). 
8.  VMMR: volatility of the money-market rate defined as a six-month window standard deviation for each 
quarter (IFS line 60b). 
9.  NBFI: Other financial institutions' domestic assets (IFS lines 42a-d) to GDP (IFS line 90 bp). 
10.  BANK: Commercial banks' domestic assets (IFS lines 22 a-d) to GDP (IFS line 90 bp). 
11.  MK: Stock market capitalization (Monthly Bulletin of the Stock Market) to GDP (IFS line 90 bp). 
12.  VV: Macroeconomic Control Variable defined in the text. 
 
 
NOTES 
